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Abstract. Software and hardware design of complex systems is becom-
ing diﬃcult to maintain and more time and eﬀort are spent on veriﬁcation
than on construction. One of the reason is the number of constraints that
must be hold by the system. Recently, Formal methods such as proba-
bilistic approaches gain a great importance in real-time systems veriﬁ-
cation including avionic systems and industrial process controllers. In
this paper, we propose a probabilistic veriﬁcation framework of SysML
state machine diagrams extended with time and probability features.
The approach consists of mapping a SysML state machine diagrams to
PRISM input language. To ensure the correctness of proposed approach,
we capture the semantics of both SysML state machine diagrams and
their generated PRISM code. We demonstrate the approach eﬃciency
by analyzing PCTL temporal logic on ATM case study.
Keywords: Sysml state machine diagram · MARTE · Probability ·
Time
1 Introduction
Constraints on system design in terms of functionality, performance, availabil-
ity, reliability and time to market are becoming more stringent. Therefore, the
design and implementation of successful systems, represents the prime concerns
of systems engineering (SE) but reveals several challenges [9]. Indeed, from one
side the systems are becoming increasingly complex, in the other side the market
pressure for rapid development of these systems makes the task of their designs
a challenge. Thus, the evaluation and the correctness of systems at early stage
of design reduces the design cost such as maintenance time and eﬀort. Recently,
the need of automated veriﬁcation techniques to cope with errors is imminent,
especially when time and probability are incorporated.
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The probabilistic verification is used to verify systems whose behavior is
unpredictable, unreliable, especially stochastic in nature. The veriﬁcation of such
systems can be focused on either qualitative or quantitative properties [4]. Quan-
titative properties puts the constraints on a certain event, e.g. the probability of
processor failure in the next 3 hours is at a least 0.88, while qualitative properties
assert that certain event will happen surely (i.e. Probability=1).
In this paper, we are interested in the formal veriﬁcation of probabilistic sys-
tems under time constraints modeled as SysML state machine diagram extended
with probability and time features of MARTE proﬁle [13]. The overview of our
framework is depicted in Fig. 1. It takes State machine diagrams and PCTL prop-
erties as input. Our approach is based on representing state machine diagram
to an equivalent PRISM model (Probabilistic Timed Automata). The PRISM
model checker veriﬁes PCTL properties on the resulting model. We extract the
adequate semantics model related to state machine diagram then, we present
the underling semantics related to the produced PRISM model. Furthermore,
we show tht the relation between both semantic preserves the satisﬁability of
PCTL properties.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 discusses the
related work. Section 3 describes SysML state machine diagram. Sections 4 and 5
provide syntax and semantic meaning of probabilistic and timed state machine
diagrams. The syntax and semantics of PRISM Model Checker is presented in
Sect. 6. Section 7 provides a mapping mechanism from state machine diagram
into the input language of the probabilistic model checker PRISM. The app-
roach soundness is proved in Sect. 8. Section 9 illustrates the application of our
mapping rules on Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) case study. Section 10 draws
conclusions and lays out the future works.
Fig. 1. A SysML State machine diagram veriﬁcation approach
2 Related Work
In this section, we present the recent works related to the veriﬁcation of behav-
ioral models then we compare them with our proposed approach.
Doligalski and Adamski [8] propose a veriﬁcation and simulation of UML
State Machine. For this purpose, two mapping mechanisms are deﬁned. The
ﬁrst consists on mapping the original model to Petri network for veriﬁcation
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according the requirements. However, probability and time veriﬁcation are not
considered. When the requirements are satisﬁed, the second mapping occurs to
generate VHDL or Verilog description for simulation. Huang et al. [11] propose
a veriﬁcation of SysML State Machine Diagram by extending the model with
MARTE [13] features to express the execution time. The tool has as input the
State Machine Diagram and as output timed automata expressed in UPPAAL
syntax [5]. UPPAAL uses Computational Tree Logic (CTL) properties to check if
the model is satisﬁed with liveness and safety properties. Ouchani et al. [17] pro-
pose a veriﬁcation framework of SysML activity diagram. The authors address
a subset of SysML activity diagram artifacts with control ﬂow. The diﬀerent
artifacts have been formalized and mapping algorithm has been proposed to
translate these artifacts to PRISM input language. The transformation result
is a probabilistic automata to be checked by PRISM. Timing veriﬁcation is not
considered. Kaliappan et al. [12] propose a veriﬁcation approach for system work-
ﬂow especially in communication protocol. The approach takes as input three
UML diagrams: state machine diagram, activity diagram and sequence diagram.
State machine diagram or activity diagram is converted into PROMELA code
as a protocol model and its properties are derived from the sequence diagram as
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Pajic et al. [18] develop a framework for veriﬁca-
tion and generation of real time applications either in C/C++code for software
or in Hardware description language (HDL) like VHDL or Verilog. The focus
of the work is a development of model translation tool from UPPAAL [5] to
Stateﬂow (UPP2SF). The checked UPPAAL model is translated to Stateﬂow
using Simulink which provides full support for C/C++ and HDLs. Ando et al.
[3] propose a veriﬁcation approach of SysML state machine diagram. The dia-
grams are translated to communication sequential process description (CSP)
and they apply the PAT [20] model checker to check the CSP models against the
LTL properties. The paper proposes a mapping rules of diﬀerent state machine
artifacts. However, time and probability are not addressed.
Compared to the existing works Table 1, our contribution improves the ver-
iﬁcation of SysML State Machine diagram by extending state machine with
elements of UML MARTE proﬁle to support time and probability. From the
comparison, we observe that few of them formalize the behavioral model and
prove the soundness of their proposed veriﬁcation approaches. Moreover, our
veriﬁcation framework is eﬃcient as it preserves all properties.
Table 1. Comparison with the related work.
Approach Formalization Probability Time Soundness Automation
[8], [3], [12]
√
[11], [18]
√ √
[17]
√ √ √ √
Our
√ √ √ √ √
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Fig. 2. A subset of State machine diagram artifacts
3 SysML State Machine Diagram
SysML State Machine diagram (SMD) is a graph-based diagram where states
nodes are connected by states edges (i.e.transition)[1]. Figure 2 shows the set of
interesting artifacts used for veriﬁcation in this paper. The behavior of a state
machine is speciﬁed by a set of regions, each of which deﬁnes its own set of
states. The states in any one region are exclusive; that is, when the region is
active, exactly one of its substates is active. A region starts (resp. stops) exe-
cuting when it initial (resp. ﬁnal) pseudo-state becomes active. When a state is
entered, an (optional) entry behavior is executed. Similarly on exit, an optional
exit behavior is executed. While in a state, a state machine can execute a do
behavior. Transitions are deﬁned by triggers, guards, and eﬀects. The trigger
cause a transition from the source state when the guard is valid, and the eﬀect is
a behavior executed once the transition is triggered (opac behavior). In addition,
the control nodes supports a junction, choice, join, fork, terminate and history
pseudo-state node. A junction splits an incoming transition into multiple out-
going transitions realizes a static conditional branch, as opposed to a choice
pseudo-state which realizes a dynamic conditional branch. To illustrate how a
probability value is speciﬁed, the transition leaving choice nodes are annotated
with the  GaStep  stereotype using the element prob of MARTE proﬁle [13].
The time is speciﬁed by applying the stereotype  resourceUsage  with ele-
ment execT ime to specify the maximum and the minimum value of the time
duration written as (value, unit, min/max), where min, max are integer values.
We present in Deﬁnition 1, the formal deﬁnition of Probabilistic and timed SMD.
Then, we propose a property that explains the state transition in SMD.
Definition 1. Probabilistic and timed SysML state machine diagrams is a tuple
S = (i, fin,N ,X, E, Inv, Enab, Prob ), where:
– i is the initial node,
– fin = {,×} is the set ﬁnal nodes,
– N is a ﬁnite set of state machine nodes,
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– X is a set of clocks,
– E is a set of events,
– Inv : N → N is the invariant constraint that represents the maximum clock
value supported by state clock,
– Enab: N → N is an enabling condition that represent the minimum clock
value for state transition,
– Prob : ({i} ∪ N ) × E → Dist(N × 2X) is a probabilistic transition function
that assigns for each state s ∈ N and α ∈ E a discrete probability distribution
μ ∈ Dist(2x × N ).
Property 1. There are two possible ways in which a SMD can proceed by taking
a transition (State transition) or by letting time progress while remaining in a
state (Delay transition):
– State transition : for s, s′,∈ N , α ∈ E s α,t→p s′ when Enab(s) ≤ t ≤ Inv(s).
– Delay transition : for s ∈ N , α ∈ E s α,t→ s when t ≤ Inv(s).
S ::=  | l : in  N
N ::= N | l : F (N ,N ) | l : D(p, g,N ,N ) | On  N | H(S) | l : | l : ×
O ::= sB | s(Sentry, Ssub, Sexit) | s(Sentry, Sdo, Sexit) | J (x1, x2) | M(x1, g1,N )
B ::=↑ S | 
Fig. 3. Syntax of State Machine Calculus (SMC).
4 Syntax
Based on the SysML textual speciﬁcation standard [1], we formalize SysML
state machine diagrams by developing a calculus called State Machine Calculus
(SMC) which is proposed in Fig. 3 that oﬀers more ﬂexibility than the graph-
ical notation deﬁned in the standard. In Table 2, each state machine diagram
artifact is represented formally by its related SMC term. In SMC syntax, two
main syntactic concepts are deﬁned: marked and unmarked terms. A marked
term is typically used to denote a reachable conﬁguration. A conﬁguration is
characterized by the set of tokens locations in a given term. An unmarked SMC
term corresponds to the static structure of the diagram.
To support tokens we augment the “Over bar” operator with integer value
n such that the Nn denotes the term N marked with n tokens. Furthermore,
we use a preﬁx label l : for each node to uniquely reference it in the case of a
backward ﬂow connection. Particularly, labels are useful for connecting multiple
incoming ﬂows towards junction and join nodes. Let L be a collection of labels
ranged over by l; l0; l1,.. and N be any node (except initial) in the SMD. We
write l :N to denote a l -labeled state N . It is important to note that nodes with
multiple incoming edges (e.g. join and junction) are visited as many times as
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Table 2. Formal Notation of SysML state Machine Artifacts
they have incoming edges. Thus, as a syntactic convention we use only a label
(i.e. l) to express a SMC term if its related node is encountered already. We
denote by D(g,N ,N ) and D(p, g,N ,N ) to express a non-probabilistic and a
probabilistic choices, respectively.
5 Semantics
For the workﬂow observation on SMD, we use structural operational semantics
[14] and [15] to formally describe how the computation steps of SMC atomic
terms take place. An element α is the label of the event triggering state transition,
x(y) inputs an object name on x and stores it in y to represent the eﬀects of
transition and τ represents a silent event. An element t is the time for state
transition and p is a probability value such that p ∈]0, 1[ . The general form of
a transition is S
t,α/b(y)−−−−−→p S′. The probability value speciﬁes the likelihood of a
given transition to occur and it is denoted by P (S, t, α, S′) where min ≤ t ≤ max
(max,min ∈ N). The case of p = 1 presents a non-probabilistic transition and
it is denoted simply by S
t,α−−→ S′. For simplicity, we denote by S[N ] to specify
N as a sub-term of S and by |S| to denote a term S without tokens. For the
Quantitative Veriﬁcation 431
call behavior case of s ↑ N , we denote S[s ↑ N ] by S ↑s N and “*” is used to
refers to the recent active substate in the state in case of shallow history. In the
sequel, we describe the operational semantic rules of the SMC calculus.
Ax-1 l : i  N l→1 l : i  N . This axiom introduces the execution of S by putting
a token on i.
Ax-2 l : i  N l→1 l : i  N . This axiom propagates the token in the marked term
i into its outgoing N .
Ax-3 ∀n > 0, m ≥ 0 l : sm  Nn l→1 l : sm+1  N
n−1
. This axiom propagates the
token from the global marked term to s.
Ax-4 l : sm+1  N
n t,α/b(y)→ 1 l : sm  N
n
. When event occurs; this axiom propagates
the token from the marked term s to N after t time units and the eﬀect b(y)
inputs a name on b and stores it in y.
Ax-5 ∀n > 0 l : s ↑ Sn  N l→1 l : s ↑ Sn−1  N . This axiom propagates the token
from the global marked term to s.
Ax-6 S[l′:]
l′→1|S|
l:s↑SnN l
′
→1 l:s↑|S|nN
. The derivation rule Ax-6 ﬁnishes the execution of a
call behavior and moves the token to the succeeding term N .
Ax-7 S
t,α→ pS′
l:s↑SnNt,α→ p l:s↑S′nN
. The derivation rules Ax-7 and Ax-8 present the eﬀect
on s ↑ Sn when S or N executes an action a with a probability p.
Ax-8 N
t,α→ 1N′
l:s↑SnNt,α→ p l:s↑SnN′
.
Ax-SUB Ssub[l′:]
l′→1|Ssub|
l:s(Sentry,Ssub,Sexit)N
l′→1 l:s(Sentry,|Ssub|,Sexit)N
. The derivation rule Ax-
SUB ﬁnishes the execution of “Sub” behavior and moves the token to the EXIT
behavior.
Ax-HIST l : N  l′ : H(S∗, S)n l→ l : N  l′ : H(S, S)n. Ax-HIST is a shallow history;
backs to the most recent active substate of its containing state.
FRK-1 ∀n > 0 l : F (N1, N2)n l→1 l : F (N1, N2)
n−1
. The FRK-1 axiom shows the
multiplicity of the arriving tokens according to the outgoing sub-terms.
FRK-2 N1
t,α→ N′1
l:F (N1,N2)
t,α→ l:F (N′1,N2)
. The FRK-2 derivation rule illustrates the changes
on a fork term when its outgoing trigger a state.
CHOICE-1 ∀n > 0 l : D(g, N1, N2)n g,α→ l : D(g, N1, N2)
n−1
. The axiom CHOICE-
1 describes a non-probabilistic choice where a token ﬂows through the edge
satisfying its guard.
CHOICE-2 ∀n > 0 l : D(p, g, N1, N2)n g,α→ p l : D(p, g, N1, N2)
n−1
. The axiom CHOICE-
2 describes a probabilistic decision where a token ﬂows through the edge satis-
fying its guard with probability p.
MRG-1 l : N  l′ : M(x, g1, N1, y, g2, N2)
n l→ l : N  l′ : M(x, g1, N1, y, g2, N2)n. MRG-1
is a transition with a probability of value 1 to put a token coming from the
sub-term N on a junction labeled by l.
MRG-2 l : l′ : M(x, g1, N1, y, g2, N2)n l,g1→ 1 l : l′ : M(x, g1, N1, y, g2, N2)
n
. MRG-2 is a
transition with a probability of value 1 to present a token ﬂowing from a junction
labeled by l to the sub-term N1 an the guard g1 is true.
MRG-3 l : S[l′ : M(x, g1, N1, y, g2, N2), lx] l→ l : S[l′ : M(x, g1, N1, y, g2, N2), lx]. MRG-3
shows the junction enabled when token arrived at one of its pins.
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JOIN-1 l : N  l′ : J(x, y)n l→1 l : N  l′ : J(x, y)n. JOIN-1 represents a transition
with a probability of value 1 to activate the pin x in a join labeled by l’.
JOIN-2 l : l′ : J(x, y)  Nn τ→ l : l′ : J(x, y)  Nn. JOIN-2 represents a transition
with a probability of value 1 to move a token in join to the sub-term N .
JOIN-3 l : S[l′ : J(x, y)  N , lx] τ→ l : S[l′ : J(x, y)  N , lx]. JOIN-3 shows the join
input enabled when token arrived at one of its pins.
FFIN S[l : ×] l→ S[l : ×]. This axiom states that if the sub-term l : × is reached in
S then a transition of probability one is enabled to produce a term describing
the termination of a ﬂow.
AFIN S[l : ] l→ |A|. This axiom states that if the sub-term l :  is reached then
no action is taken later by destroying all tokens.
6 PRISM Formalization
In this section, our formalization focus on probabilistic timed automata (PTA)
that extends the standard probabilistic automata (PA). The PRISM model
checker supports the PTA with the ability to model real-time behavior by adding
real-valued clocks (i.e. clocks variable) which increases with time and can be reset
(i.e. updated).
A Timed Probabilistic System (TPS) that represents a PRISM program (P)
is composed of a set of “m” modules (m > 0). The state of each module is
deﬁned by the evaluation of its local variables VL. The global state of the system
is deﬁned as the evaluation of local and global variables: V=VL ∪ VG. The
behavior of each module is described as a set of statements in the form of:
[act]guard → p1 : u1.. + pn : un, which means, for the action act if the guard
g is true, then, an update ui is enabled with a probability pi. The update ui
is a set of evaluated variables expressed as conjunction of assignments (V ′j =
valj)&..&(V ′k = valk) where Vj ∈ VL U VG and valj are values evaluated via
expressions denoted by eval, eval: V → R U {True, False}. The formal deﬁnition
of a command is given in Deﬁnition 2.
Definition 2. A PRISM command is a tuple c = < a, g, u >.
– act is an action label.
– guard is a predicate over V.
– u = {(pi, ui)} ∃m > 1, i < m, 0 < pi < 1,
∑m
i pi = 1 and u =
{(v, eval(v)) : v ∈ Vl}.
The set of commands are associated with modules that are parts of a system
and it deﬁnition is given in Deﬁnition 3.
Definition 3. A PRISM module is tuple M = <Vl, Il, Inv, C>, where:
– Vl is a set of local variable associated with a module,
– Inv is a time constraint of the form vl  d\ ∈ {≤,≥} and d ∈ N,
– Il is the initial value of Vl.
– C= {ci, 0 < i ≤ k} is a set of commands that deﬁne the module behavior.
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To describe the composition between diﬀerent modules, PRISM uses CSP
communication sequential process operators [10] such as Synchronization, Inter-
leaving, Parallel Interface, Hiding and Renaming. Deﬁnition 4 provides a formal
deﬁnition of PRISM system.
Definition 4. A PRISM system is tuple P = <V, Ig, exp, M, CSPexp>, where:
– V = Vg
∐m
(i=1) Vli is the union of a set local and global variables.
– Ig is initial values of global variables.
– exp is a set of global logic operators: - , ∗, /, +,−, <,<=, >=, >, =, ! =, !, &,
| , <=> , => , ? (condition evaluation: condition ? a : b means “if condition
is true then a else b”).
– M is a set of modules composing a System.
– CSPexp is CSP algebraic expression:
• M1 || M2 : alphabetised parallel composition of modules M1 and M2
(synchronising on only actions appearing in both M1 and M2)
• M1 ||| M2 : asynchronous parallel composition of M1 and M2 (fully inter-
leaved, no synchronisation)
• M1 |[a,b,...]| M2 : restricted parallel composition of modules M1 and M2
(synchronising only on actions from the set a, b,...)
• M /{a, b, ...} : hiding of actions a, b, ... in module M
• M {a ← b, c ← d, ...} : renaming of actions a to b, c to d, etc.
6.1 PRISM Semantics
The probabilistic timed automata of a PRISM program P is based on the atomic
semantics of a command C denoted by [[c]]. The latter is a set of transitions
deﬁned as follows: [[c]] = {(s, a, μ)|s |= g} where μ is a distribution over S such
that μ(s, vt) = {|0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, v ∈ V, s′(v) = eval(V )|}. The stepwise behavior of
PRISM is described by the operational semantic as follows:
INIT 〈Vi, init(Vi)〉 → 〈Vi([[init(Vi)]]),−〉INIT initializes variables. For a module
Mi, init returns the initial value of the local variable vi ∈ Vi.
LOOP 〈Vi,−〉 → 〈Vi〉 This axiom presents a loop in a state without changing
variables evaluations. It can be applied to avoid a deadlock.
UPDATE 〈Vi, v′i = eval(V )〉 → 〈Vi([[vi]])〉 UPDATE axiom describes the exe-
cution of a simple assignment for a given variable vi. Its evaluation is updated
in Vi of Mi.
CNJ-UPD
〈
V, v′i = eval(V ) ∧ v′j = eval(V )
〉 → 〈V ([[vi]], [[vj ]])〉 CNJ-UPD
implements the conjunction of a set of assignments.
PRB-UPD1 〈Vi, p : v′i = eval(V )〉 →p 〈Vi([[vi]])〉 0 < p < 1.
PRB-UPD2
〈
V, p : v′i = eval(V ) ∧ v′j = eval(V )
〉 →p 〈V ([[vi]], [[vj ]])〉 0 < p <
1 PRB-UPD1 and PRB-UPD2 describe probabilistic updates.
ENB-CMD1 V |=g,Inv(V )〈V,M([a]g→pi:ui)〉→μ ENB-CMD1 enables the execution of a prob-
abilistic command.
ENB-CMD2 V |=g,Inv(V ) V g
′,Inv′(V )
〈V,[a]g→u;[a′]g′→u′〉 a→〈V ([[u]]),[a′]g′→u′〉 ENB-CMD2 enables the exe-
cution of a command in a module.
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ENB-CMD3 V |=g,Inv(V ) V g
′,Inv′(V )
〈V,[a]g→u;[a′]g′→u′〉 a→〈V ([[u]]),[a′]g′→u′〉 ENB-CMD3 solves the non-
determinism in a module by following a policy.
SYNC 〈Vi,ci〉
a→μi 〈Vj ,cj〉 a→μj
〈Vi∪Vj ,Mi||Mj〉 a→μi.μj
SYNC derivation rule permits the synchronization
between modules on a given action a.
INTERL 〈Vi,Mi(ci)〉
aj→μ
〈V,Mi|| |Mj〉
aj→μ
INTERL derivation rule describes the interleaving
between modules.
6.2 Property Specification in PRISM
In order to perform model-checking, a property should be speciﬁed. We selected
PCTL to express such property. Formally, its syntax is given by the following
BNF grammar:
ϕ : :=true | ap |ϕ ∧ ϕ |¬ϕ | Pp[ψ] ,
ψ : :=ϕ ∪≤k ϕ | ϕ ∪ ϕ ,
Where “ap” is an atomic proposition, P is a probabilistic operator. p ∈
[0, 1] and “”∈ <,≤, >,≥. Bound until means that a state satisfying ϕ2 is
eventually reached and that, at every time-instant prior to that, ϕ1 is satisﬁed.
The time-bounded variant has the same meaning, where the occurrence of ϕ2
occur within time k. To specify the satisfaction relation of a PCTL formula a
class of adversaries (Adv) has been deﬁned [16] to solve the nondeterminism
decision.
7 The Verification Approach
This section describes the transformation of SysML state machine diagrams S
into a PTA written in PRISM input language. Listing. 1 propose a mapping
function Γ that takes as input the SMC terms deﬁned in Table 2 to produce a
PRISM commands. The action label of a command is the label of its related
term n. The guard of this command depends on how the term is activated and
minimal clock valuation. The ﬂag related to the term is its label l that is initial-
ized to false except for the initial node it is true which conforms to the premise
of the SMC rule Ax-1. The updates of the command deactivate the propositions
of the term, activate that ones related to its successors, reset the clock variable
of its successors. The functions L(n), Start(Si) and E (Si), return the label of the
initial term n , the initial and ﬁnal term of Si, respectively. Each PRISM code
generated for each state machine diagram starts from module Si and terminates
with endmodule. The call of substates transitions (line 30 and 31) synchronize
with the initial (line 42) and the ﬁnal (line 44) transition, respectively to enable
the internal transitions of substate. The ﬁnal transition (line- 38) reset the local
variables to false. However, the PTA model in PRISM model checker does not
support the shared variables. To overcome, we use the implication operator to
set the proposition to true as shown in line 31 and line 42. The clock vari-
able x is used as guarded condition for state successors activation. In line 34,
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the next node is activated when the clock x >= min and x <= max deﬁned in
the invariant clause within the module as follows:
invariant (l = true) ⇒ (x ≤ max) endinvariant
1 Γ : S → P
2 Γ (S) = ∀n ∈ S, L(n == i) = true, L(n = i) = false , Case n o f
3 [l : i → N ] ⇒ // the c l ock x i s r e s e t to 0
4 in { [ l ] l →( l’= f a l s e )&(L(N ) ’= true )&(x′ = 0)}∪Γ (N ); end
5 [l : M(x, y, g1, N1, g2, N2)] ⇒
6 in { [ lx]lx → (l′x = false)&(lg1)′ = true)}∪ Γ (N1) ∪ Γ (N2)∪
7 { [ ly ]ly → (l′y = false)&(l′g2 = true)}∪
8 { [ lg1]lg1 & g1 → (l′g1 = false)&L(N1)′ = true) & (x′ = 0)}∪
9 { [ lg2]lg2 & g2 → (l′g2 = false) & L(N2)′ = true) & (x′ = 0)}
10 end
11 [l : J(x, y) → N ] ⇒
12 in { [ l]lx ∧ ly → (l′x = false)&(l′y = false)&(L(N )′ = true)&(x′ = 0)} end
13 [l : F (N1, N2)] ⇒
14 in { [ l]l → (l′ = false)&(L(N1)′ = true)&(L(N2)′ = true)&(x′1 = 0)&(x′2 = 0)}∪Γ (N1) ∪ Γ (N2)
15 end
16 [l : D(p, g, N1, N2)] ⇒
17 Case (p) o f
18 ] 0 , 1 [ ⇒
19 in { [ l]l → p : (l′ = false)&(l′g = true) + (1 − p) : (l′ = false)&(l′¬g = false)}∪Γ (N1) ∪ Γ (N2)∪
20 { [ lg ]lg → (l′g = false) & (L(N1)′ = true) & (x′1 = 0)}
21 { [ l¬g ]l¬g → (l′¬g = false)& (L(N2)′ = true) & (x′2 = 0)} end
22 Otherwise ⇒
23 in { [ l]l → (l′ = false)&(l′g = true)}∪{ [ l]l → (l′ = false) & (l′¬g = true)}∪Γ (N1) ∪ Γ (N2)∪
24 { [ lg ]lg → (l′g = false) & L(N1)′ = true)&(x′1 = 0)}∪
25 { [ l¬g ]l¬g → (l′¬g = false)& L(N2)′ = true)&(x′2 = 0)} end
26 [l : sB t→ N ] ⇒
27 Case (B ) o f
28 ↑ Si ⇒
29 in
30 { [ l]l → (l′ = false)}∪Γ (N )∪
31 { [L(E(Si))]((L(N ) = false) ⇒ true) → (L(N )′ = true)&(x′ = 0)}∪Γ ′(Si)
32 end
33  ⇒ // minimal time f o r s t a t e t r a n s i t i o n
34 in { [ l]l & (t >= min) → (l′ = false) & (L(N )′ = true) & (x′ = 0)}end
35 [l : ×] ⇒
36 in [ l]l → (l′ = false) ; end
37 [l : 
] ⇒
38 in [ l]l → & l∈L(L(N )′ = false) ; end
39 Γ ′ : S → P
40 Γ (Si) = ∀m ∈ Si, L(m) = false ,
41 [l : i → N ] ⇒
42 in { [ l ] ((L(Start(Si)) = false) => true) → (L(Start(Si))′ = true)} ∪
43 { [L(Start(Si)) ] L(Start(Si)) → (L(Start(Si))′ = false) & (L(N )′ = true) }∪Γ (N ); end
44 [l : 
] ⇒ in [L(E(Si))]L(E(Si)) → (L(E(Si))′ = false) ; end
Listing 1. PRSIM Commands Generation
8 The Transformation Soundness
Our aim is to prove the soundness of the transformation algorithm Γ by showing
that the proposed algorithm preserves the satisﬁability of PCTL properties. Let
S be a SMC term and MS is its corresponding PTA constructed by the SMD
operational semantics denoted by S such that X (S) = MS . For the program P
resulting after transformation rules, Let Mp its corresponding PTA constructed
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Fig. 4. The transformation soundness.
by PRISM operational semantics denoted X ′ such that X ′(P) = MP . As illus-
trated in Fig. 4, proving the soundness of Γ algorithm is to ﬁnd the adequate
relation R between MS and MP .
To deﬁne the relation MSRMP , we have to establish a step by step corre-
spondence between MS and MP . First, we introduce the notion of the timed
probabilistic bisimulation relation [6,19] in Deﬁnitions 6 and 7. This relation is
based on the probabilistic equivalence relation R deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5 where
δ/R denotes the quotient space of δ with respect to R and ≡R is the lifting of
R to a probabilistic space.
Definition 5 (The equivalence ≡R). If R is an equivalence on δ, then the
induced equivalence ≡R on Dist(δ×2x) is given by: μ≡Rμ′ iﬀ μ(δ, d) ≡R μ(δ, d′).
Definition 6 (Timed Probabilistic Bisimulation Relation). A binary
relation R over the set of states of PTAs is timed bisimulation iﬀ whenever
s1Rs2, α is an event and d is a delay:
– if s1
d,α→ μ(s1,d) there is a transition s2 d
′,α→ μ(s2,d′), such that s1Rs2. The
delay d can be diﬀerent from d’;
– two states s, s’ are time probabilistic bisimilar, written s ∼ s′, iﬀ there is a
timed probabilistic bisimulation related to them.
Definition 7 (Timed Probabilistic Bisimulation of PTAs). Probabilistic
Timed automata A1 and A2 are timed probabilistic bisimilar denoted (A ∼ A′)
iﬀ their initial states in the union of the probabilistic timed transition systems
T(A1)and T(A2) generated by A1 and A2 are timed probabilistic bisimilar.
For our proof, we stipulate herein the mapping relation R denoted by MSRMP
between a SMC term S and its corresponding PRISM term P.
Definition 11 (Mapping Relation). The relation MSRMP between a SMC
term S and a PRISM term P such that Γ (S) = P is a timed probabilistic
bisimulation relation.
Finally, proving that Γ is sound means showing the existence of a timed proba-
bilistic bisimulation between MS and MP .
Lemma 1 (Soundness). The mapping algorithm Γ is sound, i.e. MS ∼ MP .
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Proof 1: We prove MS ∼ MP by following a structural induction on SMC
terms and their related PRISM terms. For that, let e1, e′1 ∈ XS and e2, e′2 ∈ XP .
We distinguish the following cases where L(s) takes diﬀerent values:
1. L(e1) = l : x  N such as x = {i, s} =⇒ ∃e1 d,α−−→1 e′1, L(e1’)= l : x  N .
For L(e2) = Γ (L(e1)), we have L(e2)=〈L(x),¬L(N )〉 then ∃e2 d
′,α−−→1 e′2 where
L(e′2) = 〈¬L(x), L(N )〉.
2. L(e1) = l : D(g1,N1,N2)n then ∃e1 g1,α−−−→1 e′1, L(e′1)= l : D(g1,N1,N2)
n−1
.
For L(e2) = Γ (L(e1)), we have L(e2)=〈l,¬lN1 ,¬lN2〉 then ∃e2 g1,α−−−→1 s′2 where
L(e′2) = 〈¬l, lN1 ,¬lN2〉.
3. L(e1) = l :  then ∃e1 α−→1 e′1, L(e1’)= l : . For L(e2) = Γ (L(e1)), we have
L(e2)=〈l〉 then ∃e2 α−→1 e′2 where ∀li ∈ L : L(e′2) = 〈¬li〉.
From the obtained results, we found that μ(e1, d) = μ(e2, d′) = 1 then e1 ∼
e2. In addition, the unique initial state of MS is always corresponding to the
unique initial state in MP . By studying all SMC terms, we ﬁnd that MS ∼ MP ,
which conﬁrms that Lemma 1 holds.
In the following, we show that the mapping relation preserves the satisﬁability
of PCTL properties. This means, if a PCTL property is satisﬁed in the resulting
model by a mapped function Γ then it is satisﬁed by the original one.
Proposition 1 (PCTL Preservation). For two PTAs MS and MP such that
Γ (S) = P where MS ∼ MP . For a PCTL property φ, then: (MS  φ) ⇐⇒
(MP  φ).
Proof 2: The preservation of PCTL properties is proved by induction on the
PCTL structure and its semantics. Since MS ∼ MP and by relying to the
semantics of each PCTL operator ζ ∈ {U, U≤k, F, Pp}, we ﬁnd that (MS  ζ)
⇐⇒ (MP  ζ) which means: (MS  φ) ⇐⇒ (MP  φ).
9 Case Study
In the following, we present a case study [7] describing an automated teller
machine (ATM). We perform the veriﬁcation of this design with respect to prede-
ﬁned properties including time constraints and [2] is the corresponding generated
code.
The ATM interacts with a potential customer (user) via a speciﬁc interface and
communicates with the bank over an appropriate communication link. A user that
requests a service from the ATM has to insert an ATM card and enter a personal
identiﬁcation number (PIN). The card number and the PIN need to be sent to the
bank for validation. If the credentials of the customer are not valid, the card will be
ejected. Otherwise, the customer will be able to carry out one or more transactions
(e.g., cash advance or bill payment). The card will be retained in the ATMmachine
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Fig. 5. ATM state machine diagram
during the customers interaction until the customer wishes for no further service.
Figure 5 shows the SysML state machine diagram of the ATM system.
ATM state machine encloses four substates: IDLE, Veriﬁcation, Eject, and
Operation. The IDLE is the default initial substate of the top state. The Veriﬁ-
cation state represents the veriﬁcation of the cards validness and authorization.
VeriﬁyCard and VerifyPin substates have interval time ]3s, 5s[,]4s, 5s[ respec-
tively (s for seconds). The SMD could let time progress while remaining in Veri-
ﬁyCard and VerifyPin states until 5 seconds and the transition is triggered or the
transition is triggered just after both states minimal time is attained (after time
progress). The probability to get pin and card validated is 0.7 and 0.8, respec-
tively. The Eject state depicts the phase of termination of the users transaction.
The Operation state is a composite state that capture several functions related
to banking operations. These are the Selectaccount, Payment, and Transaction.
When Selectaccount is active, and the user selects an account, the next transition
is enabled and the Payment is entered. The Payment state has two substates;
for cash advancing and bill payment. It represents a two-item menu. Finally,
the Transaction state captures the transaction phase and includes three sub-
states: CheckBal for checking the balance, Modify for modifying the amount,
if necessary, and Debit for debiting the account. Each one of the Payment
and Transaction states contains a shallow history pseudostate. If a transition
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targeting a shallow history pseudostate is ﬁred, the most recently active sub-
state in the composite state containing the history connector is activated.
In order to check the correctness of the ATM system, we propose to verify
two functional requirements at speciﬁc time or at diﬀerent time stamps k. They
are expressed in PCTL as follows:
1. The maximum probability value that the modiﬁcation occurs during the Bill
Payment after k=5 time units: Pmax =?[F≤k(BillPAY & Modify))].
2. The maximum probability value to get the card and pin validated after
k time units: Pmax =?[F≤k(CardV ALID & PinV ALID )].
The maximum probability value for the modiﬁcation that occurs during the
Bill payment is equal to 0.3 when k equal to 5 (time units). The veriﬁcation
results of the second property are shown in Fig. 6. After 4 time units (seconds),
the veriﬁcation results converge to 0.3. However, the veriﬁcation time for the
ﬁrst property took 246.3 s due to the state explosion during the model checking.
Fig. 6. Property2
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a formal veriﬁcation approach of probabilistic sys-
tems modeled by using SysML state machine diagram. For this purpose, the
approach maps state machine into the input language of the probabilistic model
checker PRISM. We proposed a calculus dedicated to this diagram that cap-
tures precisely their underlying semantics. In addition, we formalized PRISM
language by showing its semantics. Thus, we proved the soundness of our pro-
posed approach by deﬁning adequately the relation between the semantics of
the mapped diagrams and the resulting PRISM models. In addition, we proved
the preservation of the satisﬁability of PCTL properties. Finally, we have shown
the eﬀectiveness of our approach by applying it on a case study representing
an ATM state machine diagram where time and probability are evaluated using
PCTL properties. The presented work can be extended in the following two
directions. First, we want to transform our behavioral diagram to its equiva-
lent HDL (hardware description language) code for RTL veriﬁcation. Second,
we want to validate our approach on diﬀerent real case studies.
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